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Tough Love: Optimal Enforcement of Output
Quotas in the Presence of Cheating
Konstantinos Giannakas and Murray Fulton

Abstract
This study builds on the literature on the economics of output quotas in the presence of cheating. We extend previous work by Giannakas and Fulton (2000a) by examining the decisions of
the agency responsible for the enforcement of output quotas in a decentralized policy-making
structure. Enforcement policy design is modeled as a sequential game between the agency that determines the enforcement of the quota program (designed by a regulator), and farmers who make
production decisions. Analytical results show that the level of enforcement depends on the size of
the enforcement costs and the political preferences of the enforcement agency - the greater is the
weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare, the greater is the level of program
enforcement.

Giannakas and Fulton: Optimal Enforcement of Output Quotas

1

1. Introduction
Governments have used a variety of market intervention mechanisms to redistribute income in the
economy. Output quotas have been widely used in a number of different areas including
agriculture and fisheries. In agriculture, where quotas have been extensively analyzed, examples
of supply restrictions include the tobacco and peanut programs in the United States (US), milk
quotas in the European Union (EU), and supply management of milk, chicken and eggs in
Canada.1
Quotas redistribute income by restricting supply of the regulated commodity, thus raising its
price and generating higher returns for the original quota holders. This increased price however,
provides an incentive for producers to expand production beyond the restricted amount. And this
supply expansion is what is generally observed. Again with reference to agriculture, violation of
quota limits and excess production of regulated commodities are common in the EU Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Ockenden and Franklin, 1995; Gardner, 1996). This is especially true
for the milk quotas in the Mediterranean regions. In 1997, the penalties on detected above-quota
production of milk in Italy alone exceeded $480 million (Tagliabue, 1998). Alston (1986) reports
that when hen quotas were used to control the egg market in the state of Victoria, Australia, the
black market was estimated to account for 10-30% of all eggs. In contrast, over-quota chicken
production in Canada is not rampant, although it is significant from time to time in various areas
of the country.
Despite the incentive for and the incidence of cheating on output quotas, this issue has
received limited attention in the economics literature. The traditional analysis of this policy takes
place under the unrealistic assumption of perfect and costless enforcement. An exception is the
paper by Giannakas and Fulton (2000a) that introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the
economic analysis of the income transfer efficiency of quotas.2
In this paper, we extend the work of Giannakas and Fulton (2000a, GF hereafter) to include
the optimal enforcement response to producer noncompliant behavior. In particular, unlike GF
that examine the transfer efficiency of output quotas under different levels of exogenously
determined policy enforcement, this paper explicitly considers the optimal degree of enforcement
(i.e., the problem of the agency responsible for the enforcement of the quota program) when
enforcement is costly and imperfect.
In addition to extending the GF study to the analysis of the optimal enforcement policy in the
presence of enforcement costs and farmer noncompliant behavior, this paper incorporates a much
richer (and more realistic) policy making structure. In particular, GF analyzes the transfer
efficiency effects of quota violations in a centralized policy making structure where policy design
and implementation are the responsibility of a single agency (the government). This concentration
of policy functions is rarely the case, however.
The agricultural policy making structure in most developed countries, and certainly the US,
the EU and Canada, involves a separation of powers between the agencies responsible for policy
design and those responsible for policy enforcement. In the US, farm policy originates in
Congress (it must also be agreed to by the President) and is implemented by the US Department
of Agriculture (Moyer and Josling, 1990; Gardner, 1987a). In the EU, the amount of intervention
1

The basic analysis of agricultural policy, including quotas, is found in Gardner (1983, 1987a, 1987b).
Analysis of the US peanut program, EU dairy policy, and Canadian supply management can be found in
Rucker and Thurman (1990), Buckwell (1997), and Schmitz (1983), respectively.
2

An economic analysis of cheating on different means of income redistribution (such as coupled and
decoupled farm subsidies) can be found in Giannakas and Fulton (2000b, 2002). Cheating on farm
subsidies translates into a misrepresentation (i.e., false reporting) of the farm characteristic on which
payments are based and, unlike cheating on output quotas, it does not affect the actual production of the
subsidized commodity.
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is decided by the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the policy is implemented by the member
countries of the EU, each of which differ significantly in the political weight they assign to their
respective farm sectors (Swinbank, 1997; From and Stava, 1993). In Canada, agricultural policy
legislation is introduced by the Cabinet to the House of Commons, which must pass it before it
becomes law and is put into effect by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. Within this general
framework, the year-to-year administration may be further devolved. For supply management, for
instance, provincial quotas for chicken are set by a national agency, while the provincial
marketing boards are responsible for enforcing these quotas.
To capture this separation of powers, an institutional arrangement characterized by
decentralized policy making is adopted in this study. This richer policy making structure, which
considers separately the decisions of the policy maker and the policy enforcer, is required because
differences in the political preferences of the enforcement agency are shown to significantly
affect the level of enforcement and the incidence of output quotas.3
Enforcement policy design is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between an
enforcement agency that determines the level of enforcement of the quota program (designed by
the regulator at an earlier stage in the game), and the farmers who make the production decisions.
The payoff functions of the enforcement agency and the farmers are assumed to be common
knowledge. The enforcement agency moves first and decides on the degree to which the quota
will be enforced, knowing exactly how her choices will affect the producer optimizing decisions
and welfare. Once the enforcement policy is determined, the producers decide on the quantity to
produce while observing both the quota level and the enforcement policy in place. Different
scenarios concerning the political preferences of the enforcement agency and the decision
variables (i.e., enforcement parameters) it controls are examined within this framework.
To avoid Nash equilibria involving non-credible strategies, all formulations of the sequential
game developed in the paper are solved using backwards induction (Gibbons, 1992). Thus, the
paper is structured so that the problem of the farmers is considered first, followed by the solution
to the enforcement agency’s problem. This latter outcome determines the subgame perfect
equilibrium enforcement and production of the commodity. The welfare effects of enforcement
costs and cheating are considered in the context of a static, partial equilibrium, closed economy
model.
The title of the paper stems from a major result of the analysis, namely that quota
enforcement increases with the weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare.
The paper shows that although violation of the quota limit might be optimal for the individual
producer, producer welfare falls when over-production of the regulated commodity occurs. Thus,
an enforcement agency operating with the interests of producers in mind will practice "tough
love" – restricting the very actions that producers would prefer to undertake.

2. Output Quotas and Producer Behavior4
Output quotas have traditionally been a common means of market intervention by policy makers
who desire to transfer income to agricultural producers. Supply restrictions result in surplus
transfers from consumers to producers through their effect on market price while they do away
with the need for policy makers to raise funds through taxation. Figure 1 depicts the traditional
3

Note that, by considering a centralized policy making structure, the analysis of GF implicitly assumes
identical political preferences of the regulatory and enforcement agencies involved in agricultural policy
making.
4

The analysis in this section is an expanded (detailed) version of the producer problem analyzed in GF and
it is presented here for completeness of exposition.
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static, partial equilibrium welfare effects of an output quota scheme for a closed economy with
linear approximations of supply and demand curves (Nerlove, 1958; Wallace, 1962).
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Figure 1: Welfare Effects of Output Quotas.

Assuming that producers are the residual claimants of the returns generated from the sales of
the product less the cost associated with its production,5 a quantity restriction at Q increases
producer surplus by the area p( Q )ADpe-DBC while consumer losses from the increased
prevailing market price are given by the area p( Q )ABpe. The distortions in the use of productive
resources under the program generate a deadweight welfare loss (DWL). The distortionary cost of
market intervention is equal to the triangle ABC. The policy mechanism has no effect on the
welfare of taxpayers; income is redistributed directly from consumers to producers. The implicit
assumption in this analysis is that producers comply completely with the provisions of the farm
program, i.e., farmers do not cheat.

5

This assumption covers the case when the producers and quota holders are the same person; it also covers
the case when the producer leases the quota from the quota holder at a fixed quota rental rate.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization

4

Vol. 1 [2003], Article 2

As pointed out by GF, however, given the increased benefits from the quota program,
producers may find it economically optimal to cheat by violating the quota limit, i.e., to overproduce and sell the above-quota amount through alternative channels. Assuming that producers
know with certainty the (distorted) market price, the penalty charged per unit of over-produced
and detected quantity, and the probability that they will be investigated, the decision of the
individual producer as to whether he will over-produce (and if so, by how much) can be modeled
as decision making under uncertainty.
Assuming producer neutrality toward risk, the producer has the choice between a certain
outcome (i.e., his profits if he does not cheat) and the expected payoff in case of over-production.
The expected benefits for the producer that violates the quota limit are given by the revenues
from production, minus the cost of production and the expected penalty on above-quota quantity.
More specifically, the problem faced by the representative risk-neutral producer of the regulated
commodity can be written as:

(

)(

) (

)

max qm E [π ] = p Q + Qm q + q m − c q + q m − δρq m

(1)

where q m is the quantity produced by the representative farmer over and above his quota limit q

(

)

(the total quantity produced is q* = q + q m ); p Q + Qm is the market price when the industry
quota is set at Q and the aggregate amount of cheating by the N representative producers equals
Qm ; c(•) is the cost function; ρ is the penalty per unit of over-produced and detected quantity;
and δ is the probability that the producer will be detected (and penalized) in case he cheats on the
farm program.6 Implicit in the formulation of the problem presented in equation (1) is the
assumption that the representative producer holds competitive conjectures; he does not perceive
that he has any impact on aggregate output.
The detection probability takes values between zero and one (i.e., δ∈[0, 1]), and is assumed
to be a linear function of the quantity over-produced, i.e., δ = δ 0 + δ 1 q m . This formulation of the
detection probability captures the idea that the more a producer cheats, the greater is the
likelihood that cheating will be detected (see GF). The intercept of the detection probability
function, δ 0 , reflects the probability that the farmer will be audited.7

The slope of the detection probability function (i.e., the change in δ caused by a change in
quantity over-produced), δ 1 , is assumed strictly positive and exogenous to policy enforcers. The
parameter δ 1 is assumed to depend on the observability of producers’ actions by third parties and
6

The model in equation (1) can be modified to include aversion toward risk by the representative producer
and/or private costs from cheating. The risk averse farmer chooses q m to maximize his expected utility
(i.e.,

[(

)(

) (

)]

[(

)(

) (

)

]

max qm E [U (π )] = (1 − δ )U p Q + Q m q + q m − c q + q m + δU p Q + Q m q + q m − c q + q m − ρq m ).

The aversion of the representative farmer toward risk results in reduced cheating relative to the risk neutral
producer of the regulated commodity. Cheating is also reduced when potential costs incurred by producers
in protecting themselves from detection (i.e., µ( q m )) are incorporated into the representative producer’s
objective function. Even though both risk averse behavior and private costs from cheating change the
results quantitatively, the qualitative nature of the results in this study remains unaffected.
7

In the context of this paper, audits are regarded as random; policy enforcers determine and announce the
~
number of producers that will be investigated, N , and the identities of the particular producers are
determined at random. On this basis, for any particular producer, the probability of being audited, δ 0 , is
~
given by the percentage of the farmers that will be investigated, i.e., δ 0 = N N .
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the social attitudes towards cheating; the degree to which the third party that observes the illegal
behavior will report it to policy enforcers. The very existence of a USDA “hotline” where cases
of “fraud” can be reported (obviously by third parties) indicates that the variable component of
the detection probability is considered an important element of policy enforcement (USDA Office
of Inspector General, 2001).
Optimization of the representative producer’s objective function yields the following first
order condition for a maximum:

(

) (

)

p Q + Qm = c' q + q m +(δ 0 + 2δ 1q m )ρ

(2)

Equation (2) indicates that the farmer will produce up to the point where the market price
(presumed by the producer to be exogenous), p Q + Qm , equals the marginal cost (mc) of

(

(

)

)

production, c' q + q m , plus the marginal penalty (δ 0 + 2δ 1q m )ρ . The marginal penalty, mp, is the
change in the expected penalty function for a change in the above-quota production, where the
expected penalty function is pf = δρ q m .
Aggregating over the N representative producers of the regulated commodity and assuming
symmetry at equilibrium, the total over-quota production, Qm (= Nq m ) , is given by the expression

(

)

(

)(

)

p Q + Qm = C ' Q + Qm + δ 0 + 2δ 1' Qm ρ

(

)

where C ' Q + Qm is the industry supply curve and δ 1' = δ 1 N .

(3)

(

)

Figure 1 graphs equation (3). The equilibrium production, Q* = Q + Qm , is determined by
the intersection of the (downward sloping) demand curve, D, with the vertical summation of the
industry supply curve, S, and the MP curve. The MP curve is the horizontal summation of
individual producers’ mp curves. The D and S curves are assumed linear while the linearity of the
MP curve comes from the fact that the penalty function is quadratic in Qm . The MP curve has the

(

)

same intercept as the average penalty function, APF = δ 0 +δ 1' Qm ρ , when those are graphed
relative to the origin of Q in Figure 1, while the slope of the MP curve is twice the slope of the
APF. Although linearity of D, S, and MP has been employed for the purposes of this paper, more
general formulations can be used without changing the qualitative nature of our results.
For linear approximations of the demand and supply curves (i.e., D (Q*) = a 0 + a1Q * and
S (Q*) = b0 + b1Q * where a1 < 0 < b1 and a0 > b0 ), the aggregate above-quota production is:
Qm =

(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q ) − δ 0 ρ

(4)

b1 − a1 + 2δ 1' ρ

where Q e is the undistorted equilibrium production. All other variables are as previously defined.
Equation (4) indicates that the above-quota production depends on market conditions, the
policy variable ( Q ), and the detection probability and penalty parameters. With respect to the
enforcement parameters, the analysis indicates that Qm will be positive when δ 0 is less than

(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q ) ρ

(

)

(or, alternatively, when ρ is less than (b1 − a1 ) Q e − Q δ 0 ). These critical

values of δ 0 and ρ are denoted as

δ 0nc

and ρ

nc

respectively, where the superscript nc stands for
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no cheating.8 Of course, values of the enforcement parameters in excess of δ 0nc or ρ nc result in
complete deterrence of cheating (i.e., Qm = 0 ).
Comparative static results can be seen by examining Figure 1. An increase in δ 0 results in a
parallel upwards shift of the S+MP curve in Figure 1 and reduced cheating. An increase in ρ
increases both the intercept and the slope of the S+MP curve; the intercept shifts upwards while,
at the same time, the curve rotates leftwards. The result is a lower over-produced quantity and
hence a lower total output.
When the combination of policy variables and enforcement parameters is such that cheating
occurs, the welfare effects of the policy instrument change. Figure 1 shows the welfare effects of
cheating on output quotas. Relative to the “perfect and costless enforcement” situation examined
in the traditional analysis of output quotas, cheating results in reduced producer surplus, increased
consumer surplus and the introduction of taxpayers among the interest groups of the policy.
In particular, for above-quota production Qm , producers lose the area p( Q )AEp(Q*)-EFHI
and consumers gain the area p( Q )AFp(Q*).9 Taxpayers gain the area CGHI that corresponds to
penalty payments on detected above-quota quantity. There are also the resource costs of
monitoring and enforcement that, though not present in Figure 1, have to be taken into account.
These costs, denoted as Φ (δ 0 ) , are assumed to be a non-decreasing function of δ 0 (i.e.,
Φ ' (δ 0 ) ≥ 0 , Φ" (δ 0 ) ≥ 0 ) and have to be included into both taxpayer costs10 and welfare losses
from market intervention. Specifically, the change in taxpayer surplus in the presence of cheating
equal (1+d)[CGHI- Φ (δ 0 ) ] where d is the marginal deadweight loss from taxation (Fullerton,
1991; Ballard and Fullerton, 1992).11 Finally, the DWL of market intervention is decreased by
area AFGC and increased by (1 + d )Φ (δ 0 ) relative to the “costless deterrence” approach.
Before moving into the analysis of the optimal decisions of the agency responsible for the
enforcement of the quota program, it is important to emphasize that, while above-quota
production is the optimal decision for the individual producer that holds competitive conjectures
(since this extra production is not perceived as affecting the market conditions), aggregate
noncompliance increases total production and reduces price and total producer welfare. Note that
this situation is similar in spirit to the well-known outcome of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. While
there is no strategic interdependence between agricultural producers/quota holders in the case
examined in this paper (i.e., farmers do not believe that their actions affect the payoff of other
producers), the outcome of their optimizing behavior is a Pareto inferior situation characterized
by welfare losses for producers as a whole.
8

Assuming that the per unit penalty exceeds the gains by producers in violating the quota limit at the
margin (i.e., ρ > p Q − c' Q = (b1 − a1 ) Q e − Q ), implies that δ 0nc is less than one.

() ()

(

)

9

Recall that the welfare of producers is maximized at the monopoly output. Any increase of the supplied
quantity above the monopoly output results in reduced producer surplus. Thus, above-quota production
reduces producer surplus whenever the regulated quantity is set at, or more than, the monopoly output.
10

An alternative scenario could be the one where the enforcement costs are incurred by the producers of
the regulated commodity. In such a case, Φ (δ 0 ) is subtracted from producer surplus and the taxpayers are
the net beneficiaries of the program receiving the revenues from penalties (i.e., area CGHI).

11

It should be mentioned that there are also fixed budgetary costs arising from the operation of the agency
responsible for agricultural policy enforcement. These costs are not associated with the existence of a
specific farm program, however. Instead, the operation of the enforcement agency is due to government
intervention in agriculture. Since the existence of the enforcement agency is not contingent upon the
presence of any farm program in particular, the fixed costs from the operation of the enforcement agency
are not incorporated into the taxpayer costs from output restrictions.

http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol1/iss1/art2
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3. Optimal Enforcement by the Enforcement Agency
The analysis above shows that the above-quota production depends on the quota level Q set by
the regulator and the detection probability and penalty parameters δ 0 , δ 1' , and ρ (see equation
(4)). The penalty ρ on detected above-quota quantities is usually set elsewhere in the legal system
and is therefore exogenous to agricultural policy enforcers,12 as is the detection probability
parameter δ 1' . With the enforcement parameters δ 1' and ρ being exogenous, the only avenue
policy enforcers have for influencing producer behavior is through the choice of the audit
probability δ 0 .
This section of the paper examines the problem of the enforcement agency as it determines
the optimal enforcement of an output quota Q set by the regulator, knowing exactly how its
decisions will affect the behavior of the farmers and the welfare of all interest groups borne by
the policy. In particular, the objective of the enforcement agency is the determination of the audit
probability that maximizes its objective function. For linear approximations of the supply and
demand curves, the problem of the enforcement agency can be written as:
max δ 0 W = kCS + θ PS + TS =

[

]

2
 1
= k − a1 Q + Qm  +

 2

1 

+ θ (b1 − a1 ) Q + Qm Q e +  a1 − b1  Q + Qm
2 



[

{(

]

)

[

}

+ (1 + d ) δ 0 + δ 1' Qm ρQm − Φ (δ 0 )

s.t.

Qm =

δ0 ≤

] − (δ
2

0

)


+ δ 1' Qm ρQm  +

(5)

(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q ) − δ 0 ρ
b1 − a1 + 2δ 1' ρ

(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q )
ρ

where CS, PS and TS stand for consumer surplus, producer surplus and taxpayer surplus
respectively. The parameters θ and k represent the weights placed by the enforcement agency on
producer surplus and consumer surplus respectively. All other variables are as previously defined.
The problem specified in equation (5) is a simple, static optimization problem with both
equality and non-equality constraints. The equality constraint reflects the reaction function of the
producers of the regulated commodity (equation (4)). The non-equality constraint requires that
the optimal audit probability should not exceed the level that eliminates cheating. The reasoning
is as follows. Since monitoring requires resources, the only effect of an increase in δ 0 above δ 0nc
would be the growth of Φ (δ 0 ) . Alternatively, the inequality constraint can be seen as requiring
Qm to be greater than, or equal to, zero.

12

The optimal enforcement of output quotas when penalties are endogenous to policy enforcers is
considered in the next section of the paper.
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Assuming enforcement costs of the form Φ(δ 0 ) = ψδ 02 2 (where ψ is a strictly positive scalar
depending on things like the agrarian structure and the number of producers),13 the Lagrangean of
the enforcement agency’s problem is:

[

]

[

]

[
(

2

1 

 1
L = k − a1 Q + Qm  + θ (b1 − a1 ) Q + Qm Q e +  a1 − b1  Q + Qm
2 

 2


e
1
 (b − a1 ) Q − Q
− [θ − 1 − d ]{(δ 0 + δ 1Qm )ρQm } − (1 + d ) ψδ 02 + λ  1
ρ
2


]  −

) − δ 
2

0



while the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a maximum are:
Lδ0 =

(

[

)

(b − a + 2δ ρ)
(1+ d)ψ (b − a + 2δ ρ) + 2ρ (b − a + δ ρ) + a kρ − (b + 2δ ρ)θρ


−
δ − λ ≤ 0,
(b − a + 2δ ρ)
1

1

1

2

'
1

2

1

Lλ =

(

)(

)]

a1(b1 − a1)kρQe + (1+ d)(b1 − a1)2 Qe − Q ρ − 2a1δ1'ρ2Q(θ − k) + (b1 − a1) − a1Q − b1 + 2δ1'ρ Qe − Q θρ

(b1 − a1)(Qe − Q) −δ

0

ρ

1

1

'
1

1

'
1

1

1

2

1

2

'
1

−

2

0

' 2
1

δ0 ≥ 0 → Lδ0δ0 = 0

λ ≥ 0 → Lλλ = 0

≥ 0,

Solving the optimality conditions for δ 0 it can be shown that, for given market conditions
and resource costs of monitoring, the optimal audit probability depends on the relative weight
placed by policy enforcers on the welfare of the producers of the commodity. More specifically,
the K-T conditions imply that whenever θ is less than a critical value θ c , where

θc =

(1 + d )(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q )[ψ (b1 − a1 + 2δ 1' ρ ) + ρ 2 ]
− a1 Qρ

+k

(6)

δ 0 will equal:

δ 0θ <θc =

(

)

[ (
)(
−(b +2δ ρ )θρ

)]

a1 (b1 −a1 )kρQe +(1+d )(b1 −a1 )2 Qe −Q ρ −2a1δ1' ρ 2 Q(θ −k )+(b1 −a1 ) −a1 Q − b1 +2δ1' ρ Qe −Q θρ

(

)

(

)

2
(1+d )ψ b1 −a1 +2δ1' ρ +2ρ 2 b1 −a1 +δ1' ρ +a1kρ 2



1

'
1

2

(7)

~
When the enforcement agency audits N producers the cost of program enforcement with audit
~
probability δ 0 can be written as Φ (δ 0 ) = Nφ (δ 0 ) where φ (δ 0 ) is the cost incurred by the enforcement
agency per producer. The cost per producer when the agency enforces an audit probability of δ 0 can be
13

expressed as φ (δ 0 ) = ζδ 0 where ζ depends on things like the agrarian structure, the dispersion of the
farms, etc. The total enforcement costs can then be written as Φ (δ 0 ) = Nζδ 02 . Setting Nζ = ψ 2 we get
the expression of the enforcement costs used in this paper.
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If θ is greater than or equal to θ c , cheating will be completely deterred by an audit probability
that equals δ 0nc , i.e.,

δ 0θ ≥θ c =

(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q )

(8)

ρ

where the superscripts denote the relative weight placed by the enforcement agency on the
welfare of producers of the regulated commodity.
The optimality conditions indicate that an increase in θ increases the optimal enforcement
θ <θ
(i.e., ∂δ 0 c ∂θ > 0 ) and the likelihood that cheating will be completely deterred (i.e., the
likelihood that θ ≥ θ c ). Since θ c is an increasing function of ψ and k, the likelihood that cheating
will be completely deterred falls with an increase in either the resource costs of monitoring and/or
the weight placed on consumer welfare. The reasoning is as follows. In the previous section it has
been shown that the greater is the above-quota production, the lower is the producer surplus and
the greater is the consumer surplus. Therefore, increased significance of producers dictates
increased enforcement and reduced cheating while increased significance of consumers dictates
the opposite.14
Based on the previous results it is easy to determine the optimal enforcement in the limiting
case where the enforcement agency places no weight on producers and consumers of the
regulated commodity but its objective instead is to minimize taxpayer costs from cheating.15 In
such a case, the level of monitoring is derived by substituting zero for θ and k into equation (7)
i.e.,

δ 0θ = k =0 =

(b1 − a1 )2 (Q e − Q )ρ

[

ψ b1 − a1 +

]

2
2δ 1' ρ

2

[

+ 2 ρ b1 −

a1 + δ 1' ρ

(9)

]

where the superscript denotes the weight attached by the enforcement agency to producers and
consumers.
Equation (9) indicates that when θ=k=0 the optimal enforcement is always positive while,
comparing δ 0θ = k =0 to δ 0nc , it can be shown that δ 0θ = k =0 will always be less than the δ 0 that
completely deters cheating. Thus, the optimal policy under θ=k=0 will always involve allowance
of some cheating. Since the weight placed by policy enforcers on producer surplus is the lowest
possible, the level of enforcement is minimized. Obviously, taxpayers incur a loss whenever the
14

An alternative interpretation of the optimality conditions is as follows. For given market conditions and
weights on the interest groups (θ and k), the optimal δ 0 will be given by equation (7) whenever the
resource

[

costs

of

(

monitoring

)

(ψ)

are

ψ c = − (1 + d )(b1 − a1 ) Q − Q ρ − a1 (θ − k )ρ Q
e

2

2

greater

] [(1 + d )(

than

)(

a

critical

b1 − a1 b1 − a1 + 2δ1' ρ

)(Q

e

value

)]

ψc

where

− Q . For relatively low

enforcement costs (i.e., ψ ≤ ψ c ) the optimal response of the enforcement agency will be the complete
deterrence of cheating (i.e., δ 0 = δ 0nc ).
The payoff function of the enforcement agency when θ=k=0 is measured by the regulator’s revenues net
of monitoring costs. Alternatively, the enforcement agency can be seen as seeking the δ 0 that minimizes
the total budgetary costs from cheating, i.e., the resource costs of investigation minus the penalties
collected from producers detected cheating.
15
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optimal δ 0 is greater than δ 0θ = k =0 , i.e., the enforcement costs exceed the budgetary benefits from
enforcement.
Manipulating Lδ 0 it can be shown that when θ∈[0, θ c ), the optimal monitoring is determined
by equating the marginal benefits from enforcement ( MBe ) with the marginal costs of
enforcement ( MCe ),16 i.e.,

(

[

)

(

)(

)]

a1 (b1 − a1 )kρQ e + (1+ d )(b1 − a1 )2 Q e − Q ρ − 2a1δ1' ρ 2 Q(θ −k ) + (b1 −a1 ) − a1 Q − b1 +2δ1' ρ Q e −Q θρ

−

(1+d )2ρ

2

(

b1 −a1 + δ1' ρ

)+ a kρ
1

1

2

(b −a + 2δ ρ )
1

1

'
1

(b −a +2δ ρ )
− (b + 2δ ρ )θρ
δ = (1+d )ψδ

2

1

'
1

'
1

1
2

0

2

−

0

where the terms on the LHS and the RHS of the equation sign are the MBe and the MCe
respectively. The marginal benefits from enforcement include penalties collected on detected
above-quota quantities and the benefits from induced honesty. These latter benefits include the
consequences for interest group welfare of increased enforcement and reduced above-quota
production. Graphically, the MBe curve can be seen as a linear downward sloping straight line in
the relevant area for program enforcement (i.e., 0≤ δ 0 ≤ δ 0nc ). The MBe curve is downward
sloping due to the decrease in cheating caused by increases in δ 0 .
The position of the MBe curve depends on the relative weights placed by the enforcement
agency on the well being of the interest groups, while the resource costs of monitoring determine
the position (slope) of the MCe curve. When the enforcement agency places no weight on
producers and consumers, the optimal δ 0 is determined by the intersection of the MCe curve
with the MBeθ = k =0 curve (Figure 2, Panel (a)).
An increase in the relative value of θ will shift the MBe curve upwards, increasing both its
intercept and its slope.17 For a positive, but relatively low θ (i.e., θ∈(0, θ c )), δ 0 is determined by
the intersection of the MBeθ <θ c curve and the MCe curve in Panel (a) of Figure 2. When θ is
relatively high (i.e., θ > θ c ), the optimal δ 0 will equal δ 0nc since, in this case, the MBe and
MCe curves do not intersect inside the relevant region for policy enforcement (i.e., the area to
the left of δ 0nc ). Note that the MCe curve meets the MBe curve at δ 0nc whenever θ = θ c .
Obviously, for any given θ∈[0, θ c ), the greater are the resource costs of monitoring, the greater is
the slope of the MCe curve, and the lower is the level of enforcement.18
16

Note that when θ < θ c , 0 < δ 0 < δ 0nc . From K-T conditions Lδ 0 and λ will equal to zero.

17

The reverse is true for an increase in the weight placed on consumers. An increase in k will shift the MBe
downwards by decreasing its intercept and slope resulting in lower θ c and, thus, reduced likelihood that
cheating will be deterred.
18

Notice that while Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates the case of increasing marginal enforcement costs, the
marginal costs from enforcement can in fact be constant. In such a case, the relevant MCe curve is a
horizontal line that meets the vertical axis in Panel (a) of Figure 2 at the level of the constant marginal
costs.
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Panel (a): Optimal Enforcement
MBe , MCe

MBeθ >θ c
MBeθ <θ c

MCe

(1+d)ψ
θ =k =0

MBe

Panel (b): Optimal Production

P

S + MP

0

θ ≥θ c

δ 0θ =k =0

(

θ ≥θ
δ 0θ <θ c δ 0 c = δ 0nc

)

δ0

δ0ρ

S + MPθ <θ c
S + MPθ = k =0

ρ

δ 0θ ≥θ c ρ

450

S

δ 0θ <θ c ρ
δ 0θ =k =0 ρ

θ <θ c Q θ =k =0
Qm
m

0

Q

Qm 0
D

δ0

Q

Figure 2: Optimal Enforcement and Strategic Interdependence between the Enforcement
Agency and the Farmers.

Figure 2 also graphs the strategic interdependence between the enforcement agency and the
producers; it shows the effect enforcement decisions have on cheating. Panel (b) depicts the
cheating equilibrium for the N representative producers. The above-quota production Qm is
determined by the intersection of the industry demand curve with the relevant S+MP curve i.e.,
the S + MP

θ ≥θ c

, S + MP

θ <θ c

, or the S + MP θ = k =0 curve depending on the political preferences of

policy enforcers. An increase in δ 0 causes a parallel upward shift of the S+MP curve which
results in reduced above-quota production.
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Mathematically, the equilibrium Qm under the alternative scenarios concerning the weights
placed by policy enforcers on the welfare of the interest groups can be derived by substituting the
relevant δ 0 into the producers’ reaction function in equation (4). Since enforcement increases
with an increase in the relative weight placed by policy enforcers on producer surplus, the greater
θ <θ c
θ ≥θ c
θ =k =0
is θ, the lower is the above-quota production (i.e., Qm
> Qm
> Qm
= 0).
Overall, for any given output quota, the greatest monitoring and the lowest over-production
will occur when producer surplus is weighted highly and consumer surplus has no weight for
program enforcers. On the other hand, enforcement is minimized and cheating is maximized
when the enforcement agency places no weight on producers and consumers.19

4. Extension of the Model - Endogenous Penalties
The previous analysis and results are based on the assumption that penalties are exogenous to
agricultural policy enforcers. This is generally the case since, as pointed out previously, penalties
are typically set by the legal system. However, to complete the analysis of the optimal
enforcement of output quotas, it is useful to consider the case where policy enforcers have control
over penalties as well as the audit probability.
The main implication of endogenizing penalties is that, if there are no economic costs
associated with setting ρ, policy enforcement becomes costless. In particular, since both δ 0 and ρ
affect farmers’ production decisions, the enforcement agency could achieve its objectives by
substituting costly monitoring with costless penalties.
To show this result, note that endogenizing penalties requires another K-T condition to the
optimization problem of the enforcement agency presented by equation (5), i.e.,

ρ≥0

L ρ ≤ 0,

→ Lρ ρ = 0

Obviously, the optimal choice of an enforcement agency that places a relatively high weight on
producer surplus would still be the complete deterrence of cheating. In this case however, the
induced producer compliance will be achieved by the establishment of a very tiny probability of a
very severe penalty on above-quota quantities. More specifically, whenever θ is greater than or
equal to a critical value θ cρ , where

θ cρ =

(1 + d )(b1 − a1 )(Q e − Q ) − 2a1k Q
(b1 − 3a1 )Q − (b1 − a1 )Q e

(10)

the solution to the enforcement agency’s problem is:
ρ

θ ≥θ cρ

ρ

δ 0θ ≥θ c ρ θ ≥θc = ∞ (with

ρ

Limit δ 0

θ ≥θ ρ
c

= 0)

(11)

→∞

The above result holds whenever the weight placed on producer welfare, θ, is greater than or equal to the
weight placed on consumers, k. In a situation where k >θ, the minimum enforcement and the maximum
production will occur when the enforcement agency places zero weight on producers and positive weight
on consumers. This is not however, a realistic assumption for a developed country’s agricultural policy
makers.
19
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When, however, θ is less than θ cρ , program enforcement is imperfect and some cheating
occurs. The optimal enforcement consists of (almost) zero δ 0 and a positive but smaller than

ρ nc penalty, i.e.,
ρ

δ 0θ <θ c ≅ 0 and

(b1 −a1 ) − (1+ d )(b1 −a1 )(Qe − Q)

2

ρ

θ <θcρ

=



(

(

(12)

)

(

)

2
2 
− 2a1k Qe − Q Qe − 2θ b1 Q − a1Qe Qe + θ (b1 −a1 ) Qe − Q 



)[

(

)]

2δ1' Qe − Q −2a1 (θ − k )Q − (θ +1+ d )(b1 −a1 ) Qe − Q

Consistent with a priori expectations, an increase in the weight placed by program enforcers
on producer welfare increases both the program enforcement and the likelihood that cheating will
be completely deterred (i.e., the likelihood that θ ≥ θ cρ ). Since the enforcement of output quotas
will be perfect and costless when θ ≥ θ cρ , one interpretation of the assumption of “perfect and
costless policy enforcement” that is implicit in the traditional analysis of output quotas is that
enormous fines can be costlessly levied on producers that violate their quota limit.20

5. Concluding Remarks
Quotas have been commonly used by governments as a means of redistributing income in the
economy. The increased price associated with supply restrictions creates an incentive for
producers of the regulated commodity to cheat on the program by producing over and above the
quota limit. Despite the incentives for, and the incidence of cheating on output quotas, the
traditional analysis of the policy takes place under the assumption of perfect and costless
enforcement.
This paper develops a sequential game theoretic model of decentralized policy making to
examine the optimal enforcement and incidence of output quotas in the presence of enforcement
costs and producer noncompliance with the provisions of the policy mechanism. While the focus
in the paper is on agriculture, an area in which quotas are extensively used, the analysis applies to
other situations where quotas are used, such as fisheries.
Analytical results show that, while violation of the quota limit might be optimal for the
individual producer that holds competitive conjectures, above-quota production depresses the
market price and results in welfare losses for the producers and gains for the consumers of the
regulated commodity. The optimal level of enforcement (and, thus, cheating) depends on the
relative weights placed by policy enforcers on the welfare of the interest groups, and the resource
costs of monitoring producer compliance with the terms of the quota program. The greater is the
weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare and/or the lower are the
monitoring costs, the greater is the level of enforcement of the output quota scheme. For given
enforcement costs, enforcement of quotas is maximized when the enforcement agency places a
high weight on producer welfare.
In addition to analyzing the optimal enforcement and incidence of output quotas, this paper
highlights the conditions under which cheating is likely to be an issue. The section on
Endogenous Penalties shows that if it is possible to costlessly levy enormous fines, then cheating
will be effectively deterred in those situations where policy enforcers place a relatively high
20

Graphically, infinite per unit penalty results in an infinite slope of the S+MP curve faced by the
producers of the regulated commodity.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization

14

Vol. 1 [2003], Article 2

weight on the surplus of producers. In short, the ability to levy very large fines essentially means
that quota enforcement can be made both perfect and costless.
This result, however, raises the question as to whether large fines for quota limit violations
are reasonable. The literature on the economics of crime provides some guidance and evidence on
this issue. Specifically, it has been argued that severe punishment for minor law violations (i.e.,
Becker’s (1968) “optimal fine” result) is neither costless, credible nor just. The imposition of
disproportionate fines would likely offend the public sense of justice; in short, justice requires
that the punishment fit the crime (Carr-Hill and Stern, 1977; Stern, 1978; Stigler, 1970. On this
point see also Shavell (1987), Kemp and Ng (1979), Polinsky and Shavell (1979), Landes and
Posner (1975), Singh (1973), Tullock (1971), and Cowell (1990)).
If induced compliance through the establishment of enormous and costless fines is indeed
infeasible, then cheating on output quotas will always be an issue and should be incorporated into
economic analysis. This paper shows that cheating has important effects on the incidence of the
policy, effects that vary with the political preferences of policy enforcers and the size of
enforcement costs.
In addition to providing an understanding of the causes and consequences of cheating on
output quotas, the results of this study can assist in explaining potential differences in compliance
with policy rules observed in different areas/countries. Differences in the structure of the
agricultural sector and the efficiency of institutions could account for differences in enforcement
costs. Obviously, the greater is the number of producers of the regulated commodity and the more
dispersed are the farms, the greater are the monitoring costs (the parameter ψ in the models in this
study). Increased monitoring costs mean less auditing and more cheating. Moreover, the smaller
is the proportion of farm population, and/or the greater is the (perceived) difference between farm
and non-farm incomes, and/or the more effective is the farm lobby, the more important politically
the sector is expected to be (Becker, 1983; Gardner, 1987b). Increased weight on producers (i.e.,
a larger θ) is translated into more enforcement and less cheating.
The pattern of excess quota production outlined in the examples in the Introduction is
consistent with these results. The relatively low amount of above-quota production in the
Canadian chicken industry can be interpreted in part as a consequence of enforcement having
been devolved to the provincial market boards – since producers operate these boards, the weight
attached to producer welfare can be expected to be high. As well, the cost of monitoring is
expected to be relatively low, given the small number of chicken producers in any given province
and the ease with which over-production can be detected.21 In the Italian milk case, the weight
attached to producers can also be expected to be high, since the Italian government has a history
of providing strong support to its agricultural producers. However, the large number of dairy
producers in that country likely means that the cost of monitoring is high. As was shown, high
monitoring costs translate into reduced enforcement, all other things the same.
There are limitations in the current study. As was posed at the outset, the focus of this study
has been on the economic causes and consequences of farmer noncompliant behavior. Morality
and culture, though significant determinants of individual behavior, are not incorporated into this
analysis. For instance, there are many producers whose disutility from cheating would outweigh
any expected benefit from violating the program rules. Simply put, there are people that would
never cheat (for a discussion of the role of social conscience as a general deterrent to crime see
Grasmick and Green (1980)). By focusing on the representative producer, the effects of personal
attributes on cheating are not considered. Extensions of the model to account for producer
heterogeneity and culture could provide a better understanding of the causes of cheating and

21

For instance, there are 2,815 chicken producers and 135 poultry processing plants (many of these are
owned by one of the largest six processors) in all of Canada in 2002 (Chicken Farmers of Canada).
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assist in further explaining discrepancies in terms of policy compliance observed between
different areas/countries.
Finally, an interesting extension of this line of research involves the analysis of the optimal
policy intervention, income redistribution, and transfer efficiency of output quotas in the
decentralized policy making environment considered in this paper. The study of the optimal
regulatory responses to enforcement imperfections and the efficiency of the policy mechanism in
redistributing income in the economy are the subject of a companion article that is forthcoming in
the next issue of this journal.
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